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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
nlRs. ~1. E. HAMILTON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 




APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT CouRT OF SALT LAKE. CouNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, HoN. M. J. BRONSON, JunGE. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Appellant .alleged in her complaint (paragraph III 
Complaint, Tr. 1), ''- - - at a point immediately west 
of that place known as No. 114 East Seeond South, there 
existed a -certain hole or cavity endangering and consti-
tuting a hazard to the safety of persons passing along 
and upon said sidewalk.'' 
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(Paragraph IV complaint, Tr. 2) "- - - the defend-
ant negligently and carelessly permitted said hole or 
cavity to remain open and unrepaired and in a danger-
ous ·condition in and upon said sidewalk,'' (paragraph 
V ·Complaint, Tr. 2) ''without fault on her part said 
plaintiff stepped and fell i.nto said hole or cavity and 
by means thereof was thrown to and upon the pavement 
with great force and violence." 
The above states the substance of the complaint. 
Nowhere in· the pleading is there a des·cription of the 
alleged hole or cavity nor does it appear that the defend-
ant city knew or in the exercise of reasonable care ought 
to have known that ,said hole or cavity existed upon said 
walk. 
The evidence shows that on March 23rd, at 9:30 
A. M. (Tr. 26) plaintiff was walking west on Second 
South and the first thing she knew (Tr. 27) she had 
fallen down having ·caught her foot in a hole. It seemed 
to be a ·pretty big hole. That she had passed there once 
in a while before. (Tr. 36) 
One, William Perry Sturges, testified on behalf of 
plaintiff (Tr. 38) that he was walking 7 or 8 feet behind 
her. There was .a hole in the pavement (Tr. 39). lie 
picked her up and her legs were laying right beside the 
hole. There were two little holes there. There is a 
manhole on the south side and a water drain (Tr. 40) 
on the north side. The manhole had ''city engineer'' 
marked :nn it. The hole Mrs. Hamilton fell in was about 
10 or 12 feet from the manhole on the north side in the 
alley there-on the sidewalk in the alley on a line 12 
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or 14 inches \\Tide, 1:2 or 1-! feet long extending fron1 one 
hole to the other. There is a sean1 on each side of the 
line. (Tr. 41) 
The above is all of the testimony relating to the 
alleged defect. There is no description of the hole, its 
depth, width or character, nor its exact location with 
reference to the sidewalk. Nor is there any evidence as 
to the defendant's knowledge of the existence .of such a 
hole. Nor does it appear how the hole come to be there 
or how long it had existed prior to the alleged accident. 
We are left entirely to conjecture as to the nature 
of the claimed defect. No evidence was offered or 
received showing that the defendant city knew O! ought 
in the exercise of reasonable care to have known of the 
existence :of said defect. 
The District Court granted defendant's motion for 
a dire·cted verdict, the first two paragraph.s of which 
read (Tr. 44) : 
1. That from all of the evidence and from the 
pleadings it does not appear that there is a cause of 
action against Salt Lake City. 
2. That there has not been established by the evi-
dence any ngeligence on the part of Salt Lake City. 
THE CoMPLAINT DoEs NOT S·TATE FACTs SuFFICIENT To 
CoNSTITUTE. A CAUSE OF AcTION. 
Stripping the complaint of its conclusions and con-
sidering only the allegations of fact we have the follow-
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4 
ing: That at all times herein mentioned there existed 
a certain hole or cavity at 114 East S·econd South and 
on March 23rd, 19·38, (the only time mentioned) plaintiff 
stepp·ed and fell into said hole. There is no allegation 
that the .city had actual or constructive notice. Likewise 
before a ·complaint of this kind can be said to state a 
cause of action it must show the size, kind, location and 
character of the defect. A slight defect is not actionable. 
Certain defects might be permissible. 
"It may be laid down as a general rule that 
the complaint must contain all the facts which 
upon a general denial the plaintiff will be .called 
upon to prove in the first instance to prote-ct him-
self from a nonsuit, and show himself entitled 
to a judgment. And this statement must be made 
in 'ordinary and concise language and without 
unnecessary repetition. The code provisions in 
this respect are only declaratory of the .common 
law and are applicable to all pleadings whether 
in law or equity. 
Under the rule just stated, it is evident that 
a complaint is materially defective if, to lay the 
foundation for a recovery, the pr·oof must go fur-
ther than the allegations contained in the plead-
ings. It must be so framed as to raise upon its 
face the question whether, admitting the facts 
stated to be true, the plaintiff is entitled to judg-
ment, instead of leaving that question to he raised 
or determined upon the trial. For where a ·com-
plaint shows no legal cause of action upon its 
face, a judgment by default can no more be taken 
than it can over a general demurrer.'' 
Vol. 1, Sutherland Code Pleading, Sec. 188, 
page 122. 
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''Legal conclusions in a pleading are stillborn 
for all purposes, where they are stated in the 
place ·of ultimate facts. '' 
Chesney ~··s. Chesuey, 
33 lTtah 503 at p. 511, 94 Pac. 989. 
THE EVIDENCE FAILs To SHow NEGLIGENCE· 
ON PART OF CITY. 
Summarizing the evidence we have the following: 
It \\'"as daylight and 9 :30 o'clock a. m. The place was 
at 114 East Second South on the sidewalk in the alley. 
The hole or cavity was located on a line marked by 
seams on either side which line was 12 to 14 inches wide 
and 12 to 14 feet long extending from a manhole to a 
water drain. The plaintiff fell as she passed it. 
The city is not an insurer. Its duty is to use ordin-
ary care and diligence to keep its streets and sidewalks 
in a reasonably safe condition for the ordinary uses to 
which they are .subjected. 
Ray vs. Salt Lake ·City, 
92 Utah 412, 69. Pac. (2nd) 256. 
There is no rule requiring the city to keep its streets 
reasonably safe for travel. 
Gage vs. City of Vienna, 196 Ill. App. 585. 
Have .any facts been established by the evidence 
from which negligence may he reasonably inferred~ The 
jury would be required to speculate as to the alleged 
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defect, its ~depth, width, length, location, the length of 
time it existed, whether it resulted from w·e.ar or was 
constructed as a part of the walk and served some useful 
purpose, whether the city knew or ought to have known 
of its existence or its location with respect to the use 
made of the street. 
The defect was apparently so small that plaintiff 
could riot see it as she walked along. It was at a place 
in an alley where she should expect to encounter a ·Change 
in the surface of the way and was made obvious ·by being 
located in a line 12 to 14 inches wide marked by two 
seams ·extending fr~om a water drain 12 to 14 feet to a 
manhole. Appellant's view was not ohstructed nor her 
attention otherwise attracted. It was 9:30 o'clock in 
the morning. No evidence was offered as to how said 
defect came to be there or how long it had existed. There 
i.s neither allegation nor proof that the city created the 
alleged defe·ct. On the ·Contrary it is alleged that the 
city ''permitted said hole or ·Cavity to remain open and 
unrepaired and in a dangerous condition." (Ah. p. 3, 
-complaint paragraph IV). 
Plaintiff failed to prove that the ·city knew that the 
alleged hole existed. 
Plaintiff also failed to prove that the alleged hole 
existed prior to the time of the injury. 
The general rule is that a city is not liable for 
injuries caused by defects in a sidewalk or street in the 
absence of actual knowledge thereof or evidence that 
the defect existed in the walk for a length of time suffi-
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cient to give the city a reasonable opportunity in the 
supervision and inspection of its streets and walks as a 
whole to ~dis-cover and repair it. In determining whether 
or not the city had a reasonable opportunity to discover 
and repair the defect the jury may consider the use of 
the walk, the location and character of the defect, the 
amount of travel a~d other attending facts and circum-
stances. However such facts are not material unless 
it is shown that the defect did in fact exist prior to the 
InJury. 
Rogers vs. City of Meriden, 1929 (Conn.) 
146 Atl. 735, 71 A. L. R. 748, at 752. 
In the above case the court points out clearly that 
the placing of a drain and manhole in a street is not 
actionable. Quoting from the opinion the ·Court said: 
''The placing and maintenance of a catch 
basin and cover is .a governmental function, and 
does not of itself -constitute a defect in the high-
way, or give the traveler a right of action against 
the city. It is the duty of the city to place and 
supervise it with reasonable care, but no breach 
of that duty suhjects the city to the statutory 
penalty, unless and until the highway has been 
rendered ·defective. The liability does not even 
then attach, unless the city has failed either to 
use reasonable care to discover the defect, or, 
after actual or constructive notice, to use rea-
sona hle care in curing it. ' ' 
I.n the case of Mablo vs. City of Lansing, (Mich.), 
19-28, 220 N. W. 890, the court held that a plank with a 
nail or spike in it placed on newly laid cement as a p-ath 
within 48 hours of the injury did not give sufficient laps-e 
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of time to cause the city to he charged with constructive 
notice of the unsafe ·condition. 
The city is not negligent unless it knew of the defect 
or wa.s careless in not discovering and repairing it. 
In the case of ·City of pamville V'S. Vanarsdale, (Ky.) 
1932, 48 S. W. (2nd) 5, at p. 7: 
"To render a city liable for dangerous con-
ditions for travel of its streets and .sidewalks, 
some officer or agency of the city having in_ charge 
their maintenance must have knowledge of the 
unsafe con<)ition, or it must have existed for such 
a length of time as that knowledge of it could 
have been obtained by the exe~cise of ordinary 
care. 
·Such requirements are conditions precedent 
to liability and are as old as the exception im-
posing liability. * * *" 
City of Ge:orgetown vs. Red Fox Oil Co., 
Ky. 19'29, 15 S. W. (2nd) 489; 
· Gordon vs. City of New· Y ark, 
1930, 239 N. Y. S·. 284; 
Oklahoma ·City vs. Burns, 1935, (Okla.), 
50 Pac. (2nd) 1101. 
A failure to show that the city knew of the defect 
or that it was careless in discovering and repairing it 
is a failure to prove negligenc-e. 
In the ·case of Dress vs. City of I-Iarrisburg, 1926, 
(Pa.) 134 Atl. 400 at 401: 
"A fatal defect in plaintiff's case is the entire 
absence of any proof tending to show the exist-
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ence of such a depression at any tiine prior to the 
accident. * * * The city cannot be visited with 
constructiYe notice of an alleged defect 'vhich so 
far a.s appears did not exist, and in any event 
was not discovered before the accident. * * * 
To infer the prior existence of the defect and 
from that infer the city had notice thereof would 
be basing one presumption upon another which 
cannot be done.'' 
Malone vs. Union Paving Co., et al., 1932 
(Pa.) 159 Atl. 21. 
In the case of Meallady vs. City of New London, 
(Conn. 1933), 164 Atl. 391 at P. 392, the court obs-erved: 
'·'The city is not required to keep its streets 
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition, but 
it is sufficient if it uses reasonable care to keep 
them in .such condition. The question in such a 
case is not whether the condition was in fact 
dangerous, but 'whether it had been there long 
enough and is so conspicuous that it would attract 
the attention of the city in the exercise of a rea-
sonable supervision .of the streets.' '' 
It is not sufficient to show that the ·city knew a 
drain existed in the street at which point there was a 
defect. 
In the case of J ainchill vs. Schw·artz, ( C·onn.) 1933, 
165 Atl. 689, the court observed: 
''The notice which a municipality must re-
ceive as a condition precedent of liability for 
injuries received by reason of a ·defective highway 
must be notice of the defect itself which occa-
sioned the injury and not merely of conditions 
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naturally productive of that defect and subse-
quently in fact producing it.'' 
City of Phoenix vs. Clem, (Ariz.) 1925, 237 Pac. 168, 
at page 172: 
''Where a city improvement is not defective 
when made, but later be·comes so, the rule is that 
the city must have actual notice of a defect, or 
the defect must have existed a sufficient length 
of time to imply notice, before it is guilty of ac-
tionable negligence.'' 
Gregoire vs. City of Lowell, (Mass. 1925), 148 N. E. 
37'6, the court observed : 
''There can be no recovery for injuries re-
sulting from a defective condition of a street 
unless the muni~ipality knew or in the exercise 
of proper care and diligence might have known of 
the defect and have remedied it." 
See also ·City of Hattiesburg vs. Reynolds, 86 So. 
853, (Miss. 1921). 
In this ·Ca.se appellant has not shown the existence 
of a defect in the sidewalk. Assuming there was a defect 
as was observed in Parker vs. City of Boston, (Mass. 
1900), 56 N. E. 569, the plaintiff was bound to show 
either that the defendant knew it, or, in the exercise of 
reasonable care and diligence ought to have known it, 
in season to remedy it. There was no evidence that the 
defendant knew of the defect, if there was one; and, 
in the absence of evidence to show how long it had been 
there, it cannot be said that the defendant ought, in the 
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exercise of reasonable care and diligence, to have known 
of it, and remedied it. 
The Rule of Constructive Notice is very well stated 
in the case of ~-richolson V'S. City of Los Angeles' ( c·alif. 
1936), 54 Pac. (2nd) 725, where the court quoting from 
Taylor vs. Manson, (Calif.) 99 P. 410, 415 said at p. 
727 of the opinion : 
''While a municipality is required to exercise 
vigilance in keeping its streets and sidewalks in 
a reasonably safe ·condition for public travel, it 
is by no means an insurer against ·accidents, nor 
·can it be expected to keep the surface of its side-
walks free from all irregularities.'' 
The court further observed that: 
''The doctrine of constructive notice cannot 
be so applied as to effect .a change in the substan-
tive ob.ligations of the city." 
Also at page 728: 
''There is no evidence of any prior event 
which would put the city ·On inquiry as to the 
existence of a dangerous break at this point, and 
aside from the testimony that it had existed for 
several months, that it was about an inch and 
one-half high, and that the plaintiff thought it 
was -caused by the root of a tree growing in the 
parking beside it, there is no testimony with 
regard to the defect itself. This, we think, is 
insufficient to sustain a finding that, had the city 
fulfilled its ~duty of reasonable inspection and 
supervi.si,on of the streets of the eity as a whole, 
it would have had actual knowledge of the break. 
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There is a complete absence of proof as to the 
method ·Or period of inspection or the nature of 
the neighborhood in which defect existed or the 
character of the use made of the walks in this 
neighborhood. Because of the plaintiff's failure 
to bring home to the defendant city a neglect of 
its duty of inspection or knowledge of facts which 
would have put it upon inquiry, the city cannot 
be held to have had -constructive notice of the 
defect.'' 
With like effect in the case of Meyer vs. City of San 
R·afael, (Calif. 1937), 70 P. (2nd) 533, at p. 534 the court 
said considering an act declaratory of the general law: 
"It is not enough to show a dangerous con-
dition of the property. The municipality must 
have had notice and have failed to exercise its 
opporunity to remedy the condition, * :);; * '' 
also at page 535 : 
'' * * * Constructive notice ordinarily involves 
as an essential element actual notice of facts and 
·circumstances which are sufficient to put a prudent 
person on inquiry as to the existence of the facts 
with respect to )Vhich he is charged with con-
structive notice; that therefore, in order to charge 
a city with constructive notic·e there must be some 
element of conspicuousness or notoriety .so as 
to put the city authorities upon inquiry as to the 
existence of the defect ~o-r condition and its dan-
gerous character * * *. '' 
It is not alone sufficient to show prior existence of a 
defect. Some event must appear to put the city on 
inquiry or it must be shown that the city was negligent 
in its inspection of the walks, or that it failed to repair 
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the same after inspection and discovery of a defect. 
Cities are not and ought not to be held liable on evidence 
alone that a defect existed at the time of the accident 
or even prior thereto unless some occurrence has brought 
the defect to their attention. Their carelessness is a 
failure to reasonably inspect streets. That duty implies 
the emp1oyment of inspectors, the regular inspection 
of streets and that the inspection be performed with 
some regularity. In order to determine whether or not 
a city is or is not careless in that regard the court must 
kno\v ho'v many streets and walks there are, the u.se 
1nade of the streets, the location, the frequency of the 
inspecti·o.n and many other things material to such duty. 
If the court should permit the plaintiff to recover merely 
on a showing that a defect existed at the time of the 
accident, cities would become insurers of the safety of 
persons using the .streets. 
It is common knowledge that defects are occurring 
constantly in streets. If we were to apply our doctrine 
of constru-ctive notice so that cities may become liable 
for any defect found in its streets the subject should 
be submitted to the legislature to provide the money 
to pay the cost of cities insuring the streets. Cities face 
a hazardous problem with sidewalk maintenance. If the 
walks are kept too smooth they may become slippery and 
dangerous. Roughness is necessary to make them .safe. 
Joints must be provided for expansion approximately 
every fifty feet and joints for contraction every twelve 
or fifteen feet. The walk must be marked in squares 
to provide weaker places vYhere cracks might develop 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
without effecting the surface. Many miles of walks re-
quire cities to shoulder great burdens of inspection and 
maintenance. Heavy use together with weather condi-
tions increase the problem. 
To require cities to respond in damages when it is 
shown that a person steps into a hole or cavity is to 
require them to insure the safety of the person. To 
require the city to keep its streets in a reasonably safe 
eondi tion for travel is to require the impossible. To 
require a city to inspect its streets and use reasonable 
diligence to discover and repair defects is a reasonable 
requirement. The rule ho\vever should be given a mean-
ing that is reasonable and not so applied as to effect a 
change of the substantive obligation of the city. The 
words ''reasonable diligence'' should be given a prac-
tical application, considering the facts. The question 
should be "did the city inspeet its walks as a whole and 
if so was it negligent in discovering the defect." 
In the instant case there was no evidence that the 
city ·could h.ave found the defect had it inspected the 
w·alk. Neither is there any evidence that the city failed 
in its duty to inspect the walk or that it failed in its 
duty to inspect the streets and walks as a whole or that 
any event had occurred which would attract the cities' 
attention or that it knew the walk was defective. As 
w.as said in the case of Carsey· vs. City of New Orleans, 
181 So. 819 at p. 820 ( 19,38 La.) : 
"It is also to be horne in mind that, while 
the courts have permitted recovery against a 
municipality for injuries sustained beeause of de-
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fectiYe streets or side,ralks (as an exception to 
the general rule that the sovereign is not re-
sponsible for the torts committed by it in the 
exercise of a governn1ental function) they have, 
nevertheless, imposed certain limitations upon the 
rights afforded to plaintiffs in these cases which 
are founded upon equitable principles. In other 
words, the courts have readily realized that it is 
impossible for a municipality to police each and 
every street within its -confines with such vigilance 
as to detect all slight defects which might be 
brought about through conditi,ons of the soil, or 
by exterior forces and that it would be unjust to 
permit recovery except in cases where it has 
plainly neglected to perform the obligation re-
quired of it by law.'' 
We submit that no evidence was offered to show 
negligence on the part of the city and the motion was 
properly granted. 
THE NoTICE OF CLAIM Is INSUFFICIENT. 
The third paragraph of Respondent's Motion for 
Directed Verdict reads : 
"3. That it does not appear from the evi-
dence that a claim in the £o.rm required by Section 
15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, was filed 
with Salt Lake City, the defendant, within the 
time and in the manner required by the pro-
visions of said statute, and, therefore, the alleged 
action of the plain tiff is harred by the provisions 
of Sections 15-7-76 and 15-7-77, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933. '' (Tr. 44) 
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The plaintiff i!ltroduced rn evidence a copy of a 
letter (Exhibit A, Tr. 31, 44, 45) which reads as follows: 
"Salt Lake City, Utah. 
April 13, 1938. 
Honorable Board of City Commissioners, 
City and County Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Gentlemen: 
On March 23rd at 9 :30 A. M. while walking 
just west of 114 East 2nd South, through a defect 
in the sidewalk at that location I was injured by 
falling and having cert·ain bones fractured near 
my ankle to such an extent that I have had to 
have same in a cast, and.move ab'out on crutches 
since said injury. In view of the fact, that .since 
s.aid date I have been confined at my residence 
and have suffered extreme pain I feel that I 
should be compensated for such injury to the 
extent of not less than $500. 
Respectfully submitted for your 
immediate consideration, 
'' 
She testified that she signed the original (Tr. 31) 
and filed it with the defendant on April19,_1938. (Tr. 45). 
Section 15-7 -7·6, R~evised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
(quoted p. 14 appellant's brief) provides in part: 
·"Every ·claim against a city * * * for danl-
ages * * * shall * * * be presented to the Board 
of c~ommissioners * * * in writing signed by the 
claimant * * * and pr!op·erly verified, stating the 
particular time at which the injury happened, 
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and designating and describing the particular 
place in which it occurred, and also particularly 
describing the cause and circumstances of the 
injury or damages, ·and stating, if kno,Yn to ·claim-
ant, the name of the person, fir1n or corporation, 
who created, brought about or maintained the 
defect, obstructi~on or condition causing such acci-
dent or injury, and the nature and probable extent 
of such injury, and the amount of damages 
claimed on account of the same; such notice shall 
be sufficient in the particulars above specified to 
enable the officers of such ·city or town to find the 
place and cause ·o.f s-uch injury from the descrip-
tion thereof given in the notice itself without ex-
traneous inqury, and no action shall be maintained 
against any city or town for damages or injury 
to person or property, unless it appears that the 
claim for which the action was brought was pre-
sented as aforesaid, and that such governing body 
did not within ninety days thereafter audit and 
allow the same. * * * '' 
The right to institute an action 1n this class of 
cases is purely statutory. It did not exist as common 
law, .and therefore the ·conditions precedent fixed by the 
statute which confers the right must be complied with, 
or the action fails. 
Hurley vs. Bingham, 
63 Utah 589, 228 Pac. 213. 
It is within the power of the legislature to impose 
such conditions upon the right to sue cities and towns, 
which are merely arms of the state government, as in 
its judgment may seem wise and proper, and the condi-
'-
tions which are thus imposed are conditions precedent, 
and ·Cannot be ignored either by the claimants or by the 
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courts. In determining the effect of the above cited 
statute upon this subjct it· is ·of utmost imp·ortance to 
keep in mind its terms and provisions. An examination 
of the cases will disclose that the terms of the statute 
in the different cases cited by appellant vary to a con-
siderable ·extent, which fact is overlooked by appellant 
in citing cases in support of his view. 
Berger vs. Salt Lake City, 
5·6 Utah 403, at 408, 191 Pac. 233. 
The purpose of our statute is very ch~ar, which is to 
require every claimant to clearly state all of the ·elements 
of his ·claim to the city for allowance as a condition 
precedent to his right to sue the city. That the state 
through its law making power has an absolute right 
to impose such conditinns, all courts agree. 
Sweet vs. Salt Lake City, 
43 Utah 306, at p. 315, 134 Pae. 1167. 
THE LETTER FILED BY PLAINTIFF DID NOT 
PuRPORT To BE A CLAIM. 
The letter was not verified. It stated the time to be 
''March 23rd at 9· :30 A. M. '' The place is described as 
"while walking just w-est of 114 East 2nd South.'' The 
cause of the injury was des-cribed ''through a defect 
in the sidewalk .at that location.'' The circumstances of 
the injury was stated: "I was injure·d by falling.'' 
The statute ( 15-7 -7'6 supra) requires "such notice 
shall be sufficient in the particulars above specified to 
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enable the officers of such city * * * to find the place and 
cause of sucl1 injury from the description thereof given 
in the notice itself without extraneous inquiry * * *. '' 
The time ·stated in the letter does not refer to the 
year of the occurrence. The place ''just west of 114 
East Second South" is indefinite and uncertain. The 
cause of the injury ''through a defect'' is most uncer-
tain. No one could tell whether it was a depression, a 
protuberance or some temporary obstruction or ex-ca-
vation placed there by a third person. No information 
at all is given by the word "defect". The circumstances 
"by falling" do not help us in determining the nature 
of the defect ·Or cause of the injury. It would be just as 
reasonable to suppose that plaintiff stumbled over a 
tempora~y obstruction or fell into a hole as to suppose 
that she stepped into a depression. It would be im-
possible to determi·ne the pla:ce and -cause of suc:h injury 
from the notice itself without extraneous inquiry. It 
would likewise be just as impossible to determine the 
place and ·cause of such injury by an examination of the 
place mentioned in the notice. 
The plaintiff could under the statement in the letter 
claim that the injury occurred at one place just as well 
as another. Without extraneous inquiry, yes without 
interrogation of .plaintiff herself, the letter was wholly 
valueless to the city. Not one of the many conditions 
required by the statute was complied with. The letter 
did not have any characteristics of a notice required by 
the statute. Under it any kind of a claim could be 
suecessfully made. The city was not afforded an oppor-
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tunity to examine the alleged defect and determine for 
itself what the facts were. It was s!olely at the mercy 
of the plaintiff and must rely upon her to point out the 
''defect'' in a complaint or by evidence. 
The notice was served April 19, 1938. Must one 
assume the .accident referred to ,happened in 1938 ~ With 
hundreds of miles of sidewalks to supervise and keep 
in repair, all situated upon ground that is subjected to 
the moisture .and extreme eo.ld of the Winter as well as 
the dryneg.s and extreme heat of the .Summer, together 
with the heavy use at driveways, alleys and intersections 
J 
by motor vehicles, and the added hazard caused by grow-
ing trees and constant excavation in and around the 
same for furnishing the !services -of utilities to residents, 
a valid reason is observed w by the legislature should 
requ1re such conditi~ons before a city may be subjected 
to suit. 
Appellant contending that the letter is a valid claim 
cited and relies upon the case of Connor vs. Salt Lake 
City, 28 Utah 248, 78 Pac. 479. The claim in that case 
was filed in 1902 pursuant to ~he provi·sions of Section 
312, Chapter 20, Revised Statutes of Utah 1898, which 
required claims to be filed : 
''describing the time, place, cause, and extent 
of the damage or inj~ry. '' 
S-ection 15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, required 
claims to be filed : 
"stating the particular time at which the 
injury happened, and designating and describing 
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the particular place in \vhieh it occurred, and also 
particularly describing the eause and -circum-
stances of the injury "" * * ·such notice shall be 
sufficient in the particulars above specified to 
enable the officers of such eity or to,vn to find the 
place and cause of such injury fron1 the des-crip-
tion thereof giYeu in the notice itself \vithout 
extraneous inquiry * * *. '' 
The Connor case (supra) cited by appellant was 
decided ~ oY. 11, 1904, and the said section 312 of the 
1898 La,vs under which the Connor claim was filed was 
amended by the next legislature by an act known as 
Ch. 5, Laws of Utah 1905, approved Feh. 15, 1905 which 
act was adopted expressly to avoid the effect of the 
rule in the said Connor case. It will therefore be ,ob-
served that the Connor case 'vas by legislative enactment 
overruled and is not now the law in this state. This 
illustrates the importance of checking the statute under 
which the claim is filed. 
We have considered the letter as a whole. Let us 
now separate it and consider its parts. 
THE PLACE. 
"Just west of 114 East S·econd South." We sub-
mit that this descripti,on does not meet the statutory 
requirement ''and designating and describing the par-
ticular place in which it occurred" espe-cially when we 
consider the evidence. It app·ears that appellant fell 
at 114 East 2nd South (.Ah. 9~-17) and not west of it. 
The hole or cavity was in a strip of cement marked 
by a seam that extended from a manhole to a drain. 
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According to the evidence a proper designation and 
description ·could have been given. There seems to be 
an alley referred to in the evidence that could have 
been used to aid in the designation and description. 
Without some outside inquiry one could not find the 
alleged "defect" from the designation or description 
given. 
THE ·CIRCUMSTANCES ·OF 'THE INJURY. 
''I was injured by falling and having certain hones 
fractured near my ankle." Again we submit that the 
statutory requirement is not met. ''And also partic-
ularly des-cribing the * * * ·Circumstances of the 
injury." The city is entitled to know what appellant 
claims in this regard. She testified that she stepped 
into a hole or cavity. Such information could not have 
been ohtaine,d from the notice. An examination of the 
place referred to in the notice could not reveal any in-
formation as to the circumstances. The only inquiry 
that could reveal the fact testified to would be one made 
of appellant. If the statute means anything it certainly 
means that claimant should describe the circumstances 
as she claims the same t~o be. To permit a claim a.s indefi-
nite and uncertain as the above letter to stand would be 
to open the door to fraud. To disregard the requirement 
that the circumstances be described would he the equiv-
alent of disregarding the requirement of filing a notice. 
It seems to us that one of the most important conditions 
required as a condition pre·cedent to filing an action is 
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that ·clain1ant give notice of the circumstances because 
they can only be learned by the statement of the claimant. 
THE CAUSE OF THE INJURY. 
'' Throug'h a defect in the sidewalk'' does not meet 
the requirement ''and also particularly describing the 
cause * * * of the injury." Here again evidence was 
offered that the ·cause of the injury was a hole or cavity. 
Could one suspect that a depression, or hole or cavity 
caused the injury des-cribed from the notice itself without 
''extraneous inquiry~'' The word ''defect'' means 
''want or absen·c.e of somethi'll·g necessary for com-
pleteness or perfection,'' W ebste.r 's New International 
Dictionary. The city is entitled to know what the claim-
ant claims the defect to be as -vvell as to 1be advised where 
it is so that they may see for themselves. If this were 
the only failure to comply with the statute, it would 
invalidate the notice. 
In the cas-e of Van Loan vs" Village of Lake Mills, 
(~Wis. 1894), 60 N. W. 710, the notice was very similar 
to the one a.t bar. It fixed .the place of injury and 
described the ·Cause as ''while walking home on the side-
walk on Madison Street opposute the Moravian church, 
in company with Prof. T·erry, owing to a defective side-
walk which caused me to fall. The court said: 
" 'owing to a defective sidewalk on Madison 
Street ·Opp·osite the Moravian church,' might pos-
sibly answer for 'the place where the damages 
occurred,' if the defect itself was described so that 
the place could be found from the defect. But 
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there is no attempt to describe the defect. What 
wa:s it~ The question is not answered. This 
notice is a condition precedent to maintaining the 
suit, and it must have reasonable certainty t!o be 
of any use whatever. * * * This notice is a 
blank, so far as any description of the defect is 
concerned, and that is the very thing the Village 
authorities wished, and had the right to be in-
formed of. * * *'' 
In the case of Nicholaus vs. ()ity of Bridgeport, 
(Conn. 1933) 16.7 Atl. 826, the assistant clerk of the city 
made out the notice and told plaintiff to sign it which 
he did without reading or learning its contents, and 
which notice read in part: 
'~For injuries the result of a fall on Chopsey 
Hill road about 500 feet fr~o,m Fairview Avenue 
going east on Dleeember 24th at 3 p.m. * * *'' 
The .conditions required by the Connecticut statute were 
far more general than those required by the Utah law. 
The law of Connecticut required a notice ''of such injury 
and a general description ~of the ~same, and of the cause 
thereof and of the time and place of its occurrence'' and 
also providing that no notice shall be held invalid or 
insufficient "by reason of an inaccuracy in * * * stat-
ing the time, place or cause of its occurrence,'' if there 
was no intention to deceive the ·city. 
The eourt held at page 827: 
''the giving .of such notice as the statute requires 
is a condition precedent to the maintenance of the 
a.cJtiorr1, the obligation to -comply (p. 828) with the 
statute rests upon the plaintiff, * * * The 
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assistant city clerk could not waive ·compliance 
'Yith the statute by aceepting a defective notice 
or thereby stop the city from taking advantage 
of a failure to meet the statutory requirements." 
The ~ause of the injury "~as held to mean the defect 
or defective condition of the way which brought about 
the injury. The court held further that the above notice 
entirely failed to ·state the cause of the fall and hence the 
injury. Our statute re~ds ''and also particularly de-
scribing the cause'' as well as the circumstances ·Of the 
injury. The particularity of the description must he 
sufficient to enable the city to find the "cause of such 
injury from the des-cription thereof given in the notice 
itself without extraneous inquiry.'' 
In the case of Merr-ill vs. City of Springfield, (Mass. 
1933) 187 N. E. 5·51, in considering a notice which re-
ferred to the cause of the injury thus: ''My injuries 
wer~ due to a defective, dangerous condition of said 
crosswalk in \vhich snow and ice accumulated as a result 
of which I fell,'' the court held: 
''This notice was insufficient since the cause 
is not !specific and 'is equally consistent with an 
excavation in the way, and obstruction upon the 
way, an original mal-construction of the way, a 
worn, uneven and irregular conditi~on of the sur-
face of the earth, an accumulation of snow or ice 
or both, or any of the many varieties of defect 
which may exist in a way.' " 
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THE TIME. 
''On Mat·ch 23rd at 9 :30 A. M. '' does not fulfill the 
condition ,., and stating the particular time at which the 
injury happened.'' No year was specified. The notice 
must show that the injury happened within 30 days 
prior to the date of its proper filing with the city. 
In the .case of Luke vs. City of J(eokuk, (Iowa 1926) 
211 N. W. 583, the court considering a claim where the 
time was thus : ''the evening of March 2i2nd' ', the year 
of the alleged injury not being inserted in the notice, 
said at Page 585: 
"In this case the notice that was served on 
the -city contained no statement of the year in 
which the accident happened. It may have been 
the present year, or any year in the past. The 
statement is defective in this respect, and being 
a c-ondition precedent to bringing of the action, 
we are of the opinion that it does not comply 
with the requirements ·of the statute, and hence 
t. '' was no no 1ce. 
The notice in the instant case did not specify the 
year. As the above ·court observed, quoting from White 
vtS. Town of Stowe, 54 Vt. 510. ''so, if the notice does 
not state that the injury happened within 30 days next 
preceding its receipt, they (the city officials) might as 
well say that the injured party had no claim against the 
town.'' Pariol evidence is not permissible to supply the 
legal requirements of the notice. The claim is fatally 
' defective. 
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THE CLAil\I \~VAs NoT VERIFIED. 
The plaintiff concedes that the claim is defective in 
this regard and ·cites the case of White vs. Heber City, 
82 Utah 547, 26 P. (2nd) 333, and also other authorities. 
The authorities almost unanimously hold defective claims 
that are not Yerified as required by the statute. 
Appellant says at page 30 (Appellant's brief) that 
plaintiff's claim "\\,.as handled by respondent by the 
usual method adopted for the disposition of such claims.'' 
No evidence was offered in support of this assertion. 
Appellant further says that the reference of the plain-
tiff's alleged notice to a city department ''together with 
the negotiations had between the (p. 31) respondent and 
the city attorney's office sh~ow conclusiyely that respond-
ent had notice of the claim and took some action there-
on.'' The author of this statement has not read the 
record. Nowhere is there any evidence of negotiations 
between the city attorney and the appellant or the city 
and any city department in relation to said notice or any 
other matter. 
Again appellant says: (Appellant's brief, page 32) 
''The respondent's silenee, tog·ether with the action taken 
regarding the claim, including the offer to pay appellant 
$25.00 in settlement of respondent's liability, constitute 
a plain representation to appellant respecting the 
validity of her claim.'' Again appellant has failed to 
read the record. No evidence can be found respecting 
an offer in compromise. The only comp·etent evidence 
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in the record is the silence of respondent and its failure 
and refusal to consider the letter as a claim. 
Appellant was asked by her attorney if she had 
ever been notified that her claim had been allowed and 
she answered: ( Tr. p. 32, A b. p. 11) ''A. No, excepting 
I went to see Mr. Irvine, and he said they wouldn't accept 
it, but he offered me $25.00 tn settle the case.'' Motion 
was made· by respondent to strike the answer, (Tr. p. 32, 
A b. p. 11-12) and the court ruled that the portion (Tr .. 
p. 32, Ab. p. 11 and 12) ''of the witness' answer where 
she said '~Mr. Irvine offered her $2:5.00' is stricken from 
the record.'' 
The only evidence then in the record is that "Mr. 
Irvine" told the appellant that the city would not accept 
her claim. 
It is evident that ' 'Mr. Irvine' ' could not act f~or 
the :c.ity without son1e .authority to d·o so a:nd no attempt 
was made to show that the city offered to make a com-
promise or did anything but refuse to accept the appel-
lant's claim. "Mr. Irivne'' is a stranger to this case 
and to the respondent in the action. The motion wa·s 
properly granted. 
· The appellant urges that the city was not misled 
to its injury by the defective notice. (Appellant's brief 
p. 31) ''It was not shown at the trial that the respond-
. ent was prejudiced in any way by any alleged insuffi-
ciency of the claim.'' The burden of proof rested on 
appellant. However no notice was given by the exhibit. 
In the ·case of Rauber v. Wellsville, (N. Y. 1903), 82 
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N. Y. S. 9, 11, the court in answering the argument that 
the city vYas not misled to its injury by a defe-ctive notice, 
said: 
"It "\\'"ould be permissible for a clain1ant in 
the same manner to escape the consequences of 
failure to comply \Yith the provisions of the stat-
ute in not stating the tin1e of his alleged accident 
or the nature of his claim, and in fact \Ve see no 
reas·on \vhy he might not invoke the same doctrine 
to relie-ve hin1 when he had failed to verify his 
claim~ or had given verbal instead of written 
notice thereof, or had filed his claim 11 instead of 
6 months after the accident happened. In each 
of these cases, in the place of ·compliance with the 
absolute statutory requirement, he might substi-
tute evidence, no matter how loo-se and inaccurate, 
provided only a jury might he permitted to say 
therefrom that the municipality had somehow 
learned of the -details of the accident, and there-
fore had not suffered any determinable injury 
from the omission * * *." 
Claims must be verified as required by the statute 
before an action against the city can be maintained. 
Clawson vs. City of Ithica, 212 N. Y. S. 433; 
Cole vs. City of Seattle, 
(Wash. 1911) 116 Pac. 257. 
In the case of Spencer vs. City of Calip~atria, (Calif. 
1935) 49 Pac. (2nd) 320 the court states at p. 321: 
''No right to bring such an action exists inde-
pendent of statutory enactment and, in giving 
such a right, the Legislature may pres-cribe the 
proce-dure and conditions under which it may be 
exercised. That such a claim must be verifi·ed is a 
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reasonable provision which should not be held to 
be ineffectual and meaningless.'' 
No WAIVER REsULTED FRoM A FAILURE OF CITY's 
GoVERNING BoDY To PoiNT OuT DEFECTS IN LETTER 
FILED BY APPELLANT. 
Appellant claims that a duty rests upon the city 
to point out the lack of verification of appellant's letter 
to the appellant if the city intended to rely upon it and 
failing to do so a waiver resulted. 
In the ·case of Chamberlain vs. City of Sag·immw, 
(Mich. 1903) 97 N. W. 156 where the silence ,of the city's 
governing body was urged as a waiver at p. 157 the court 
said: 
''The council took no action whatever, except 
to receive the commuication and refer it to a com-
mittee. There was no waiver, unless it was the 
duty of the council to· notify the claimant that 
such notice was void, point out wherein it was 
void, and give her an opportunity to present a 
valid one. . Public rights are not, in my judgment, 
to be thus waived. The liability of municipal cor-
porations for defective streets and sidewalks is 
purely sta.tutoty, and he who attempts to fasten 
that liability upon the municipality is bound to 
strictly comply with the statute. A waiver can 
only be predicated upon some duty of the cor-
poration to act. No such duty is imposed by the 
statute, expressly or impliedly. After giving the 
notice, both parties may rest, if they choose, and 
as they did in this case, without further action 
until the claimant sees fit to plant his suit." 
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"'To 'YaiYe means in law, 'to relinquish in-
tentionally a known right, or intentionally t~o do 
an a~t inconsistent 'Yith claimiTI·g it'.'' 
Ridge~vay vs. City of Escarnaba, (Mich. 
1908) 117 N. W. 550. 
Appellant urges that the latter part of the claims 
statute supports his contention that the eity should point 
out to appellant the f~ilnre to verify her c.laim if the city 
is to rely upon it. In this contention the appellant is 
entirely in error and has not carefully read the statute 
and eases cited to support the contention. Let us now 
analyze this argument. 
Section 15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, pro-
vides at the end thereof: 
''Every claim, other than claims above men-
tioned, against any ·city or town must be pre-
sented, properly itemized or des-cribed and verified 
as to correctness by the claimant or his agent, 
to the g~nverning body within one year after the 
last item of such account or claim accrued, and if 
such account or claim is not properly or suffi-
ciently itemized or des-cribed or verified, the gov-
erning body may require the same to he made 
more specific as to itemization ~or description, or 
to be corrected as to the verification thereof.'' 
The first part of the statute refers solely to claims 
for injuries alleged to have been caused by defeetive 
streets and sidwalks. 
Section 15-7-77, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, pr!o-
vides: 
"It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to 
any action or proceeding against a city or town 
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in any court for the collection of any claim men-
tione-d in Section 15-7-7 6, that such claim had not 
been presented to the governing body of such city 
or town in the manner and within the time speci-
fied in Section 15-7 -7·6; provided, that in case an 
account or claim, other than a claim made for 
da,mages on accournt of the wnsafe, defective, dan-
gerous, or obstructed condition of any street, 
alley, crossw·alk, w·ay, sidewalk, culvert or bridge, 
is required by the governing body to be made 
more specific as to itemization or description, or 
to be properly verified, sufficient time shall be 
allowed the -claimant to comply with such require-
ment.'' (Italics ours). 
It will he noted that claims other than for streets 
and sidewalk injuries _a year is allowed for filing and in 
the event such .claims are not properly verified the city 
may require a corrected verification. This does not 
apply to elaims relating to stree)ts or sidewalks. Darhl 
vs. S. L. C., 4:5 U. 544, 147 P. 622. The provision as to 
verification of claims relating to sidewalks and streets 
i·s absolute and unconditional, and reads; claims must be 
"properly verified". 
Appellant cites the following cases to .support his 
contention that the -city waived verification of his alleged 
notice of elaim hy its silence and failure to call the defects 
to the attention_ of the appellant. 
Bowma;n v.s. Ogden City, 
33 U. 196, 93 P. 561; 
Burton vs. Salt Lake City, 
·69 U. 186., 253 P. 443, 51 A. L. R. 364; 
Husbands vs. Salt Lake City, 
92 U. 449, 69 P. (2nd) 491, at 499; 
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Moran vs. Salt Lake City, 
53 U. 407, 173 P. 702. 
In the Bowman case (supra) a written notice was 
filed \Yith the city December 21, 1903, claiming· injury 
December 10, 1903. The notice was unverified. The 
city inYestigated the claim, considered it on its merits 
and adopted a report reconnnending payment of the 
same and $5.00 \Vas paid to and received by Bowman 
in satisfaction of the same. The court -observed that, 
at page 204 (Utah), Chapter 19, p. 12, Sess. Laws 1903, 
the statute under which the notice of cliam was filed, 
provided: 
''that claims of this character must be presented 
to the city council in writing, signed by the claim-
ant or his agent, properly verified, and describing 
the tin1e, place, cause, and extent of the damage 
or injury, and if the city council shall refu.se to 
hear or consider a claim because not properly 
made out, notice thereof must be given the plain-
tiff a;nd sufficient time allowed him to hav·e the 
claim prop-erly itemized and verified. The plain-
tiff's claim was not properly made out as provided 
by the statute in several particulars, principally 
because it was not verified, and the extent ·of this 
injury or damage not sufficiently described. The 
city ·council, however, did not decline to consider 
it, nor to investigate the facts, because the claim 
was not properly made out. On the contrary it 
treated the claim, and acted upon it, as though it 
had been in full compliance with the statute. In 
such case the defects ,of the claim presented were 
waived, and were not thereafter available as a 
defense to the action but on the ground that the 
settlement and payment were in satisfaction of 
plaintiff's elaim, a verdict ought to have been 
directed for the defendant.'' (Italics ours). 
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The statute under which the said claim was filed 
was later amended to read substantially as it does now. 
(February 15, 1905.) See Chap. 5, Laws of Utah, 1905, 
page 5. 
The rule in the Bowman case as applied to claims 
relating t~o sidewalks and streets of cities is not now the 
law in Utah and the ease is not in point. The rule may 
have some application as to claims under the second part 
of the statute, that is claims other than those relating 
to sidewalks because of the provision in our present 
statute above noted relating to the seeond .class of claims 
to the effect that the -city may require correction as to 
a defective verification. But even there it is doubtful 
that such rule would apply if there is a total absence of 
verification. H.ow ·could a verification be corrected if 
there was none especially after the one year period had 
expired~ 
This court has heretofore observed that claims under 
our statute are divided into two -classes: one consists of 
claims for damages or injury alleged to have heen caused 
by unsafe streets :or sidewalks and the other .consists of 
every claim other than claims above menti,oned. The 
important question to decide is does the claim at bar 
eome within the first or second class. Dahl vs. Salt Lake 
City, 45 Utah 544 (548), 147 Pac. 622. 
In the Burton ease (supra) the ~c.laim wa.s made to 
recover damages for ~death of a girl by drowning in a 
city owned and operated bath house, the said -claim being 
made under the second -class of ·Cases. The court ob-
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served at page 193 (Utah): "The statute requires that 
in case a claim is deemed insufficient or defective in 
certain particulars, the insufficiency or defect mu.st be 
pointed out by the city. The city not having done so it 
cannot now be heard to say that the claim is insufficient.'' 
Our statute no'v under consideration does not so provide. 
Nevertheless the claim in that case was filed under the 
second part of the statute which now provides that the 
city may require correction as to verification where 
defective. The Burton ease, .considering a claim under 
the second class of claims as the Bowman case, did not 
hold that the ·entire absence of verification could be 
corrected. The case is not in point and has no reference 
to claims for sidewalks or streets, where particular-
ization and verifications are required as a ·condition pre-
cedent. 
In the Husbands case (supra) the claim was filed in 
March, 19·34, claiming an injury by reason of a sprinkling 
wagon running over a boy on July 8, 1933, nearly eight 
months prior. This claim likewise was filed under the 
second class of cases where the city may require a veri-
fication to be made more specific. · The court ohserved 
that, at page 465 (Utah: ''The claim here involved must 
come under the latter portion of said section ( 15-7-7 6, 
Rev. Stat. U. 1933) above quoted, referring to claims 
other than those mentioned in the first part of said 
:section," a~nd again rut page 4616: "It must he remem-
bered that this claim falls under the second division of 
section 15-7-76, which apparently does not require the 
same particularly as is required by the first part of 
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that section.'' This case is not an authority for the con-
tention that the city waived a compliance with the statute 
but on the contrary ·could well be cited by respondent to 
illustrate that claims filed under the first part of the 
clai~ S'tatute, claimant must particulariz·e and the 
claims be verified in the manner required by the statute, 
whereas such is not required of claims under the second 
part of said section. The Husbands claim was verified 
and the only question there was whether it was sufficient 
in other particulars, which the court held were not re-
quired under the se-cond part of the claims statute. 
The city is under no duty to examine claims for 
defe-cts therein where they relate to injuries upon side-
walks and streets. It may take such advantage ,o.f such 
claims filed as it ,chooses. As to ''every claim, other than 
claims'' for streets and sidewalks described in the first 
class of claims, if the claim ''is not properly or swffi-
ciently itemized or described or verified" the -city "may" 
require it to be made "·more spec·ific as to itemization 
or description, or to be corrected a·s to the verification 
thereof.'' 
The ·cases cited by appellant relate to the second 
part of the statute where there is a dis-cretion which 
might be construed as an implied direction to examine 
the claim for defects and p·oint the same out to elaimant 
if the city intends to take advantage of such defect. 
The citation of such ·cases brings again before us rather 
forceably the necessity of examination of the statute 
under which the ,claim is filed. 
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Appellant cites the Moran ·Case supra (p. 53 appel-
lant's brief) with the connnent that Moran failed to 
prove the giving of notice of any kind to the city. The 
evidence shows that a letter was sent to the May.or and 
City Council claiming payment for damage by overflow 
of water into a conduit then being constructed for the 
city, which claim \Yas made under the second class of 
claims under the S~ta.tute and the court observed at page 
411 (Utah): 
''We are clearly of the op1n1on that under 
the ·clear language of the statute the a:etion of 
the plaintiff did not meet the requirements of 
section 312, supra. Accepting the statement of 
Mr. Moran as to the contents of the communica-
tion sent to the Mayor and city eouncil, it does 
not appear that that claim was verified as to its 
correctness, or that it was itemized, or described, 
or that it contained any of the facts required by 
the provisions of the section. 'To hold that the 
communication ·clairn.ed to have been sent to the 
city was a compliance with the statutes, without 
some action on the part of the city waiving such 
requirements, would be, in effect, to nullify the 
provisions of the statute and to bind eities, re-
gardless of whether claimants had advised them 
in any particulars as to the nature of the claim, 
and to that extent at least would effect the repeal 
or repudiation of what the Legislature considered 
to be a prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit 
against municipalities.'' 
Appellant cites further the case of Hurley vs. Bing-
ham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (App. brief p·. 57) and 
quotes an extract from the opinion urging that a ''proper 
application'' of the statute would suggest that a waiver 
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had resulted because the city failed to call attention to 
defects in the claim. In that case a minor, eight years 
of age, was injured on a street and his guardian ad litem 
commenced an action without the filing of the claim 
required by the first part of the statute relating to streets 
and sidewalks. The plaintiff cited the ·case of Sw·eet vs. 
Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 Pac. 1167, and Berger 
vs. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 233, where claims 
were presented to the ·city under the first part of the 
statute and actions commenced for damages additional 
to the sums ·Claimed in the notice filed. The plaintiff 
in the Hurley ca·se urged that the rule permitting re-
covery for purely consequential damage arising out of 
injuries described in the notice o{ ·claim but which 
consequential damages were not claimed in the notice 
was an authority for the proposition that a minor child 
not capable of filing a notice should not be prevented 
fr.om bringing his action. The -court held that a minor 
child if he expects to recover must file a claim and 
further pointed out that the -court in the eited cases held 
that damages may he recovered only for the injuries 
described in the claims. That consequential damages 
not known at the filing of the claim may if properly! 
pleaded he recovered for only those injuries described 
in the r:laim. The court in further considering the cited 
cases then observed at p. 593 (63 Utah): 
·"After all, as we conceive the purpose of the 
law, when the injured party has p-resented his 
claim stating the time, place, cause, and circum-
stances of his injury and the extent of his dam-
ages as far as known to ( p. 594) him, he has fairly 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and fully con1plied \Yi th the spirit and intent of 
the statute. But this is far from excusing the 
failure to present any clain1 at all within the limit 
fixed by la""· There is a lcide distinction between 
presenting a defect·ive cla.im W'hich at least names 
the time, place, and circumstances of the injury 
and in presenting no .claim at all. In the first 
supposed case the municipality is at least notified 
sufficiently to investigate the merits of the clailn, 
\vhich, evidently, is the 1nain purpose of the stat-
ute. In the second supposed case the city re-
cei Yed no notice at all, and the very purpose of 
the statute is defeated. By this we do not mean, 
however, that if the municipality has notice other-
wise than by presenting a claim, presentation of 
the claim is thereby rendered unnecessary or im-
material. By the great weight of authority as 
we read and interpret the adjudicated cases, the 
presentation of a claim within the time fixed by 
law is a condition precedent to the bringing of an 
action in cases of this kind. The right to insti-
tute an action in this class of- cases is purely 
statutory. It ,did not exist at common law, and 
therefore the conditions precedent fixed by the 
statute which confers the right must be complied 
with, or the action fails.'' Berger v. Salt Lake 
City, supra. (Italics ours). 
The court in the Dahl case (supra) above quoted 
observed at p. 549 ( 45 Utah): 
"That the Legislature may, by statute, pre-
scribe conditions up,on w·hich swits may be brought 
and maintained against a municipality is con-
ceded.'' 
The examination of the decisions considering the 
first part of the statute relating to streets and sidewalks 
reveals that the court consistently requires the claimant 
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to c~o·mply with the ·conditions set out in the statute or 
as said in the I-I ur ley and the Berger cases (supra) the 
conditions precedent fixed by the statute which confers 
the right of action must be complied with, or the action 
fails. This same rule applies to the claims under the 
second subdivision of the statute. As an analogy it was 
observed by the court in the Hurley case (supra) quoted 
at page 57 ~of appellant's brief, there is a wide distinc-
tion bet,veen a defective verification and no verification 
at all. This was considered by the court in the ease of 
White vs. Heber City, 82 Utah 547, 26 P. 2nd 333 where 
the court held that the verification though defective, 
p. 555 (Utah) ''yet, in substance stated enough to comply 
with the statute and to invoke considerati~on and action." 
A total absence of verification would not invoke consid-
eration and action by the ·court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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